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Abstract—	 Cloud computing is significantly reshaping the 
computing industry built around core concepts such as 
virtualization, processing power, connectivity and elasticity to 
store and share IT resources via a broad network. It has emerged 
as the key technology that unleashes the potency of Big Data, 
Internet of Things, Mobile and Web Applications, and other 
related technologies; but it also comes with its challenges – such as 
governance, security, and privacy. This paper is focused on the 
security and privacy challenges of cloud computing with specific 
reference to user authentication and access management for cloud 
SaaS applications. The suggested model uses a framework that 
harnesses the stateless and secure nature of JWT for client 
authentication and session management. Furthermore, authorized 
access to protected cloud SaaS resources have been efficiently 
managed. Accordingly, a Policy Match Gate (PMG) component 
and a Policy Activity Monitor (PAM) component have been 
introduced. In addition, other subcomponents such as a Policy 
Validation Unit (PVU) and a Policy Proxy DB (PPDB) have also 
been established for optimized service delivery. A theoretical 
analysis of the proposed model portrays a system that is secure, 
lightweight and highly scalable for improved cloud resource 
security and management. 
Keywords— Cloud Computing; Security; Access Management, 
User Authentication, JSON Web Token (JWT). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Cloud computing is a holistic computing construct that 
encompasses the atomized facets of Information Technology; It 
is panoptic and embodies not just virtualization, but also 
dynamic hyper-scaling, elasticity, resource-pooling, isolation 
and automation [1]. Despite the considerable benefits of cloud-
based services, there some significant concerns that have 
affected the reliability and efficiency of this emerging 
technology [2].  
Understanding the technological backdrop of cloud 
computing is essential in the analysis of various security and 
privacy issues in the cloud ecosystem. Such issues range from 
user authentication, access management, compliance, and 
recovery, to areas such as data locality, and long term viability. 
The recent EU referendum that abrogates the US-EU safe 
Harbor Agreement, to be replaced with a General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 is an issue synonymous 
with data locality in the cloud ecosystem [3]. 
Cloud computing has come to stay with all its inherent 
benefits of increased speed and agility, massive economies of 
scale, high flexibility, and rapid provisioning [4] or de-
provisioning. However, security and privacy issues in the cloud 
SaaS model has been an area of challenge; in fact, authentication 
& authorization, confidentiality of data, security of network 
information and infrastructures, identity management and 
single-sign on processes [5] are some areas in this regard and 
which is driving many research work. Many researches are 
aimed at addressing the challenges of verification and protection 
of credentials, account hijacking issues, breach of data [6], and 
simultaneously also, the inherent challenges that arises with 
increased user access to cloud SaaS resources [7].  
Users can be authenticated to access resources via 
passwords, biometric, token-based or through certificates [8]. 
But, regardless of the access protocol used, the round-trip 
security of the access information from the user to the cloud 
SaaS must be ensured.  This requires not only the SaaS provider, 
but also the app builder, and end user involvement [9]. The 
secure handling of the access token, and secure user 
authentication redirect (OpenID connect, JWT, SAML) is a must 
for the SaaS developer. Also, the authorization process (Oauth2) 
should be handled through secure HTTPS/TLS transmissions. 
Tokens are system generated arbitrary construct that asserts 
the identity of what it claims to be [10]. Token-based 
authentication embodies the exchange of client authentication 
credentials for a server generated authentication token; and for 
subsequent client requests to access SaaS resources, the tokens 
are sent as part of the request in the HTTP header to the server. 
This reuse of the same user access token for accessing protected 
resources governed by certain policies can be a challenge, 
especially when a resource access policy is updated and the user 
access token is still valid. In fact, this can introduce a Time-
Based vulnerability (timing attack) on the protected resources; 
and with multiple users accessing the resource, the vulnerability 
index can increase exponentially. Hence, an authentication and 
authorization model that limits such vulnerabilities and 
enhances secure resource access have been proposed and 
evaluated. 
 
II. JSON WEB TOKEN (JWT) 
JWT is a standardized tripartite (Header, Payload and 
Signature) token structure that is encoded in a compact JSON 
serialization format (using Base64-URL) consisting of JSON 
Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [10]. 
Both serializations use different keys for signature and 
encryption. The JSON Web Key (JWK) and JSON Web 
Algorithm (JWA) are cryptographically embedded in each JWT. 
Its seamless compatibility with X.509 key certificate makes it 
able to carry more information. RFC7519 discusses 
implementation standards for how JWTs can be signed and 
encrypted [12].  Tokens can be access tokens, refresh tokens or 
identity tokens [10]. JWT access tokens can be used for 
validation of subsequent client request without making frequent 
calls to the resource server or database. This feature of JWT 
access tokens can abridge the service latency of OAuth2 [13]. 
JWS and Public Key Cryptography (PKC) are used for the 
access token validation. Access tokens can have limited validity 
periods via embedded expiration time. Access-related claims 
can also be embedded as part of its payload. While access tokens 
map user access request to cloud SaaS resources, Identity tokens 
are useful in Single Sign On (SSO) and identity federation 
scenarios where users can access different SaaS resource 
securely without frequent credential provision [6]. However, 
many SaaS apps in the cloud ecosystem utilize the generic SSO 
and authorization process (Fig. 1.) [14] for access management 
regardless of the policies that might govern such SaaS resources.  
When SaaS resources are governed by a standardized and 
well-structured policy database, accurate mapping of authorized 
users with the resource policy should be well implemented. This 
should involve verifying and validating that each user request 
token to the SaaS resource is in tandem with the current policy 
governing the SaaS resource; and when the policy of the SaaS 
resource is dynamically updated, the user access token should 
either reflect the updated policy or be marked invalid.  
 
Fig. 1: SSO & Generic Identity Federation 
 
III. RELATED WORKS 
Various performed research and manufactured models have 
been proposed for user authentication and access management. 
An integrated model for handling identity and access 
management was proposed in [6]. This incorporates a model for 
identity management via an identity system and a model for 
access management authorization via attributes (Attribute Based 
Access Control - ABAC). This raises the issues of scalability 
with increased heterogeneous user access to the cloud resource 
for which an exponentially large number of attributes must be 
understood and managed for a single resource request call [23]; 
In addition, because attributes only make sense when they are 
associated with a user, object, or relation, the practicality of 
heterogeneous user audits based on attributes in cloud sphere can 
also be a challenge. 
The identity model also utilizes the Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) and OAuth protocols, whilst the 
ABAC model utilizes a rule engine via digitally signed 
predefined XML rules. Nonetheless, whilst SAML stipulates a 
standard for token creation that is expressive and flexible, it 
comes at a cost in size and complexity [12]. The token size is 
further increased by its use of XML and XML Digital Signatures 
(XML DSIG); not to mention other implementation 
complexities. This can be a challenge in SaaS implementations 
requiring simplicity and compactness.  
In [15], a fully decentralized identity management 
framework for personal cloud interoperability was proposed. 
The framework utilizes JSON Web Token (JWT) and 
NameCoin as used in block-chain. It proposes a decentralized 
pattern for sharing public key based on NameCoin (NMC) 
technology.  However, current concerns on technology 
integration, regulatory issues, cultural trends, etc. [16] limit the 
widespread adoption of the technology.  
[17] depicts an S-RBAC model for SaaS systems. The model 
incorporates an authentication component, access filter server, 
access control server, a user dynamic constraints server, and a 
permission management center. These components work 
concurrently to provide secure access to resources. However, 
classical scalability issues of the RBAC like permanent role 
assignment, constraints on time and authorization periods, rule 
expression based on context, and vulnerability to covert 
channels [18] still affect the model.  
In [19], an integrated architecture for cloud identity and 
access management was proposed. It involves four components 
– Cloud Service Provider (CSP), identity management, policy 
management, Resource Engine and the Access Decision making 
component. The architecture depicts a workflow for user access 
to resources either by a CSP, or uploaded by the users 
themselves. However, a particular SaaS resource may be 
composed of a plethora of micro-services for which access 
policy to each micro-service should be unique rather than having 
a generalist resource access policy. This implies that a proper 
resource access categorization cum micro service categorization 
should be well implemented to reflect judicious combination of 
attributes and roles of both users and resources [23]. In fact, the 
most challenging issue in this part is to define, manage and map 
access policies according to capabilities of service provider and 
requirements of subscribers [24]. 
Furthermore, a cloud token management system was 
proposed in [20] for verifying user authorization and data 
correctness. This is based on a behavior-based token generation 
process for the tripartite (upload, download, update) activities 
carried out by the user on the cloud resource. It implies that the 
token management system generates a token for every 
process/event performed by the user. This raises some concerns 
over some authorized users’ processes with malicious intents 
that get a valid token from the TMS, which might lead to 
resource corruption, downtime, and other issues. Therefore, the 
TMS should move beyond generation and logging, to 
incorporate resource-driven user access mapping and 
management. 
[21] and [22] describe the application of token based 
authentication in different scenarios, and specify various token 
structures. While structures may differ in design and 
specifications, none offers a token-based dynamic resource 
policy management for user accesses via the statelessness and 
compactness provided by JWT. 
 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
The proposed model facilitates user access to protected 
resources (SaaS resources or micro-services can have sensitive 
or non-sensitive data. That is, resource categorization based data 
sensitivity) via secure JWT access tokens.  
These accesses are monitored and mapped to be in tandem 
with the current Resource Access Policy (RAP). Every user 
request call to the resource goes through a Policy Match gate 
(PMG) and each event or process is monitored by a Policy 
Activity Monitor (PAM) which ensures that the user access 
tokens making the request call have the appropriate RAP, even 
though the token is still valid. This use of JWT tokens both at 
client and server side rather than a SAML tokens ensures 
statelessness and compactness, and thereby reduces overheads 
which might occur from frequent calls and transmissions of the 
tokens via HTTP headers. 
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Fig. 2. Proposed model 
The proposed model encompasses the following processes:  
§ User authentication and authorization.  
§ Authorized user access to protected resources – with 
valid access token and no update on the RAP.  
§ Authorized user access to protected resources – with 
valid access token and an update on the RAP. 
A. Pre-Requisites 
These processes assume the following pre-requisites: 
o Availability of a well-configured Policy Database. 
o Since implementations might be on a case by case 
basis, we suggest using standard industry benchmarks 
(such as: low vulnerability index, scalability and 
adaptability, ease of integration, XACML formats, 
etc.) for determining the apposite Policy Database 
configuration. Such policy database can be defined by 
an enterprise and stored with a cloud provider. 
o Cloud based Identity providers (IdPs) and Authorization 
Servers (AS) are trusted. 
o Using a trusted cloud based IdPs and AS is pertinent 
for SaaS resources. Similarly, AS and IdPs should be 
chosen with regards to use cases via standardized 
industry benchmarks. 
o Users are registered users with the IdPs. This is necessary 
because unregistered users will have to go through a 
registration phase to obtain their digital identities. 
o Re-direct communication is via TLS 1.2 and HTTPS 
o This use of TLS 1.2 and HTTPS is because of the 
obvious cryptographic advantages of AES and MD5-
SHA1 which provides secure end-to-end transport for 
the tokens. 
 
B. Components 
The model delineates the following components which aid 
to provide continuous secure access to resources even when the 
resource access policy is updated and the user access tokens are 
still valid. 
1) Policy Match Gate 
This is the connecting and mapping interface between the 
user access rights and the defined policies in the policy database. 
Python Web Service Gateway Interface (WSGI) can be used for 
the implementation of the PMG.  The PMG ensures that the user, 
even while his token is still valid, can only access the protected 
resource or micro-service specified by the Policy Database (PD). 
It’s the interface between the user POST and GET calls, and the 
Resource Server’s responses. 
2) Policy Control Module 
This is the policy admin interface that synchronizes calls to 
the policy DB and policy validation module (PVM). As a control 
and admin unit, it interfaces with the PAM, to determine when a 
policy update is required, it handles policy retrievals from the 
policy database, policy archiving via interface with the PMG, 
and can be used for auditing user activities based on matched 
policies by the PMG and its interface with PAM statistics. 
3) Policy Validation Module 
A sub-component of the PCM; when a resource policy is 
updated, validity check of the current valid user token and the 
new resource access policy is required before being forwarded 
to the PMG. This provides a double authentication feature and 
ensures that the user is only matched to the allowed resource 
access permissions. This validation checks involves the dynamic 
creation of new payloads in the JWT that is being passed in the 
request headers. This payload is unique and the JWT 
dynamically signed based on some strong cryptographic 
algorithms and resides server side waiting for the next valid user 
request. This is used to assure correctness of access rights for 
every process request. 
4) Proxy Policy DB 
This is a high speed DB cache which can be implemented in 
memory to reduce frequent calls to the Policy DB. This is 
necessary because a plethora of heterogeneous users can access 
a particular SaaS resource having the same policy level, 
therefore, making frequent calls to the Policy DB for 
multifarious users on the same resource can increase latency 
even with optimized DB solutions.  
5) Policy Activity Monitor. 
This is the module for statistics and risk management. It 
ensures user access rights are within allowed resource policy 
access provisions via periodic checks with PDB and the 
Resource Server. 
For statistics, rather than creating tokens for each user 
behavior, it monitors and logs user activities, request calls, and 
other events based on pre-defined benchmarks, user attributes, 
user roles, and token validity. Also, for risk monitoring, its 
interface with the PCM triggers policy decisions and policy 
update request on a SaaS resource based on user activities. Audit 
trails and accounting can easily be performed as required either 
user-driven audits, or resource access audits. 
 
C. Processes 
1)  User Authentication & Authorization 
This is the first process required by all intended users of the 
SaaS resources regardless of the resource categorization. The 
user/app/device needs to provide their apposite digital identities 
which can be verified with the trusted IdPs and AS. Successful 
identity verification creates an access token for the identity. JWT 
access tokens are unique to each identity and are periodically 
persisted with a short expiration time at client side for 
subsequent calls that reuse the access tokens, and also to prevent 
unauthenticated access. 
UAD sends RFA via AuthC 
RS verifies AuthC  
If AuthC == 200 OK: 
RS generates JWT (See token format below) with GAR 
RS_UAD_response = JWT 
UAD persist JWT for subsequent request calls  
Else: 
RS  R-AuthC to AS 
AS verifies AuthC 
If AuthC == 401: 
AS R-UAD to IdP 
IdP verifies AuthC 
If AuthC == 401: 
UAD_registration = UAD-R 
 
TABLE I. THE NOTATIONS OF PROPOSED MODEL 
Notation Descriptions 
UAD User, App, or Device 
AuthC Authentication Credentials: Username,  
Password, Location ID, IP Address, etc. 
401 HTTP unauthorized access code 
RFA Request for Access 
RS Resource Server: Server store for  the SaaS resource 
AS Authorization Server 
GAR Granted Access Rights 
R- Redirect- 
-R -Required 
 
HTTP redirects between the AS, RS and IdP are used for the 
initial authentication and access authorization to protected 
resources. This utilizes the advantages of OAuth2.0. but because 
the tokens generated are JWT, it reduces the latency of OAuth 
2.0 services for subsequent request calls that require validating 
the access tokens. In addition, the model proposes using the 
structured JWT registered claims but with a unique custom ID 
claim that references the RAP updates to a valid JTI (JWT ID 
tokens).  
 
Format: 
Header:  
{ 
    “alg”:  “HSHA256”, 
“typ”:  “JWT” 
“kid”: “IdP’s JWK set URL” 
  } 
Payload: 
 { 
 “iss”:       “#appbackend”, 
“sub”:      “#coyname”, 
 “aud”:       “#appfrontend, intended UAD”, 
“exp”:       “#timeofexpiration(posix format)”, 
“nbf”:       “#null or #setastartdate”, 
“iat”:          “#timeofexpiration(posix format)”, 
 “jti”:        “#unique JWT ID”, 
 “rapID”: “#unique identifier for resource access 
policies(rap): It can be a string,  number, 
or an array”. 
               } 
 
 Signature: 
  { 
“Base64-encoded (Header.Payload)” + “private key”+ 
“Algorithm” 
} 
  
 JWT Token =  !(base64Encode) ℎ01203. 5167812. 9:;<1=>30?@AB,D  
 
* The “rapID” payload is part of the JWT and contains the 
following data: 
“rapID”: [“rap_iat”, “rap_Tno”, “rap_V”, “rap_reqC”, “rap_jti”] 
 
Where: 
rap_iat = issued timestamp for the updated policy. 
rap_Tno = total number of policies updated. 
rap_V = validity check flag for the policy. 
rap_reqC = required credentials from the user. 
  rap_jti = the unique jti for which this rapID is mapped to. 
 
2) Authorized User Access with Valid Token & No Update 
on the RAP 
Here, authenticated and authorized users have access to the 
protected resource based on their initial AuthC and access 
privileges. Token persisted at the UAD site carry payload data 
which contain the GAR privileges. The rapID during this 
process is set to a value representing the current state of the UAD 
token, the RAP update level, and the RAP update requirements; 
and of course, all subsequent UAD call to the resource server are 
monitored by the PAM for assurance. 
3) Authorized Access with Valid Token & Updates on the 
RAP 
Because JWT are stateless, persisted at client sites, and are 
contained in HTTP headers that are used for subsequent request 
calls to the RS as long as its “exp” payload is still valid, 
authorized users with malicious intents can have access to 
resources for which they aren’t supposed to. A combination of 
resource- and user- driven access control mechanism via JWT 
can be a solution. Harnessing the rapID claim on the JWT that 
is mapped to a valid JWT assures that users are always within 
resource policy boundaries. 
When the RS updates the RAP for a particular resource while 
being accessed by an authorized user with a valid token, process-
traps are triggered by the PAM requiring the UAD to update its 
AuthC to be in tandem with the new RAP. This process-trap also 
set the rapID payload data at the RS server side as this new valid 
token for the user JTI. Once supplied, the RS redirects to the 
PMG for proper mapping of supplied credentials; PMG checks 
if the policy validity is synonymous with the AuthC via the 
PCM. Once confirmed ok, the UAD is issued a new JWT with 
the same JTI and the rapID set to the current state of the UAD 
token, the RAP update level, and the RAP update requirements. 
D.   Sample Use-case Schematics 
This use case describes a simple scheme for the model’s 
capabilities and components; together with the inter-relationship 
between them.  
- User A requires access to a particular SaaS resource X 
(SaaSR-X) residing on Resource Server 2 (RS2). 
- User A need to authenticate himself via the trusted IdPs and 
AS. This is represented as (cloud AA) 
- Once authenticated, RS2, in tandem with PMG creates a 
JWT with a JTI and a rapID set that is mapped to User-A. 
- Subsequent access to SaaSR-X requires reuse of the created 
JWT and is checked at the PMG and monitored by the PAM 
per call if the “exp” payload as configured on the JWT is 
still valid and there is no RAP update on SaaSR-X. 
- User-A decides to access another SaaS resource Y (SaaSR-
Y) still residing on Resource Server 2 (RS2) or there is an 
update on the SaaSR-X. 
- PAM notices and triggers a PMG check (process-trap) for 
userA AuthC and rapID value, if OK, access is granted, 
else, RS2 request for updated AuthC from User-A. 
- User-A supplies the updated AuthC required to access 
SaaSR-Y or to match the newly updated RAP on SaaSR-X. 
RS2 redirects to PCM for validation and confirmation, if 
OK, PCM triggers the PMG for a possible match to the 
exact GAR of User-A. RS2 uses the PMG matched info, 
obtained from the rapID to create a new JWT for User-A. 
User-A valid token is either updated to reflect the new GAR 
or blacklisted, and a new one issued. 
 
V. EVALUATION 
Theoretical analysis of the model promises the following 
competitive objectives and security indices. 
A. Security 
MITM: The model adopts a dual authentication mechanism 
for each UAD requests at the PMG and at the RS. This ensures 
concurrency of policy and token per UAD request and assures 
security of cloud resource. However, when the RAP policy is 
dynamically updated based on UAD activity that is monitored 
by the PAM, RS listens for UAD response. While waiting, 
malicious hackers cannot tamper with the info because nothing 
has been sent from the RS; but from the PMG, and the rapID 
which was used by the RS has changed, which renders any token 
residing at the client side or in transit invalid, thus making the 
probability of token interception, almost zero. 
Timing Attacks: An analytical side-channel attack that 
exploits computational and communication data interactions on 
crypto-processing systems [25]. Ensuring all received JWTs are 
duly verified in a lucid and succinct verification contract of 
allowed crypto “alg”, and other payload/header data cum the use 
of the “kid” makes the verification cut in stone without 
undergoing unauthorized mutation. 
B. Scalability and Efficiency 
Cloud based authentication via trusted IdPs promises 
capability to meet increased user access demands. Also, the 
stateless and compact feature of the JWT UAD GAR are highly 
portable via HTTPS headers without undue latency during peak 
demands. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Process Scenario 
TABLE II. COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 
Objectives Proposed Model Dancheng  Indu  Sudha  Balamurugan 
Authentication mechanism Token based (JWT) - Token based  Token based Token based 
Access control mechanism Token based (JWT) RBAC ABAC Token based Token based 
Compact & stateless token structure Yes No No No No 
Dual authentication / SSO support Yes No Yes No No 
Access control Scalability Yes No Yes No No 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A token-based authentication and access control model was 
proposed in this paper. The paper leverages on the stateless and 
compact feature of JWT for authentication and access 
authorizations for cloud users. There was the succinct 
introduction into basic cloud computing and security concepts 
that glides into related research works.  JWT was explored with 
regards to its format, crypto algorithms, and key ids. A proper 
implementation of the payload data via the introduction of a 
resource access policy id was seen to enhance needed 
authorization challenges. Also, components such as PMG, PCM, 
and PAM were introduced to ensure process authentication per 
request call via valid tokens from UAD. The simulated tests and 
practical implementation of the proposed model will be a cause 
for future research in other to measure performance statistics at 
the interfaces of each component and possible security lapses. 
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